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Despite attempts at cleansing the Ottoman archives, after the armistice of 1918,
of material incriminating the Young Turk government in planning to annihilate
the Armenians, the prime ministerial archive (Bas bakanl|k Ars ivi, or BOA) in
Istanbul still contains invaluable documentation on the Armenian Genocide.
Contrary to the common belief, which suggests that the Ottoman documents in the
BOA were created solely in order to obscure the actions of the Ottoman government,
the author argues that this archive contains information that runs completely
counter to the official Turkish denial thesis and actually elucidates both the intent
of Ottoman authorities and how the genocide was organized. Based solely on
Ottoman materials, the author demonstrates that the treatment of the Armenian
population during World War I was different from that of other minorities at the
time.
Mirroring the dissent over the Armenian Genocide itself, two factions have formed
around different assessments of the Ottoman materials in the Prime Ministerial
Archive (BOA).1 For those who defend the ‘‘official Turkish thesis,’’ the events of 1915
cannot be considered genocide but, rather, were unexpected consequences of the
relocation of Armenians during the war years. To support this claim, they rely
exclusively on the Ottoman documents in the BOA as the only trustworthy source.
This faction distrusts not only American, British, German, and Austrian documents
but also the materials documented by the Military Tribunal proceedings in Istanbul
as politically motivated distortions of the events. On the other hand, some critical
Western scholars maintain that only the Western archives are reliable, since some
documents from the BOA were produced in order to color events, while others have
been purged in order to cover up the genocide.
The common logic underlying both of these positions is that the two sets of
documents are mutually contradictory. Each faction insists on the exclusive use of its
own favored archival sources. I will argue here that both extremes are missing the
point. It is erroneous to assume that the Ottoman documents from the BOA were
created solely in order to obscure the actions of the Ottoman government. In fact, they
contain information that runs completely counter to the official Turkish thesis,
elucidating the intent of Ottoman authorities and documenting how the genocide was
organized. Ottoman materials found in the BOA in Istanbul support and corroborate
the narrative of the Armenian Genocide as documented in Western Archival sources.
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Critical scholars regard the Ottoman documents as unreliable and trivialize their
importance for six main interrelated reasons. First, as I have shown in a previous
publication,2 there is strong evidence suggesting that the archives were purged of
documents relating to the Armenian Genocide. Second, the method by which some of
these documents were produced is dubious. As Vahakn Dadrian has shown, during the
preparation and implementation phase of the genocide, Ottoman authorities ‘‘resorted
to questionable methods in securing the documentation for episodes involving the
deportation of the Armenian population.’’3 Third, scholars cannot rely on the extant
collections because of the selective publication of Ottoman documents that appear to
support Turkish claims.4 The ‘‘two-track’’ communication system used during the
implementation of the genocide enabled such selective publication. The telegrams
attributed to Talaˆt Pasha sent to the local governors call for special attention in this
respect (see below). Fourth, omissions in the cataloging of the archival materials raise
suspicions that many documents have been consciously withheld from the public.5
Fifth, working conditions in the Ottoman archives have been an issue in the past.
Problems included difficulty in obtaining catalogs, the arbitrary rejection of requests to
photocopy documents, the dismissal of ‘‘suspicious’’ people from the archives, and the
theft of research materials from visitors.6 The final reason is a natural result of some of
the factors mentioned above: no scholars have had complete access to the documents,
and so no one has been able to establish a general overview of their content.
As a result, most critical scholars maintain that the Ottoman documents have been
purged in order to cover up the genocide, and are thus unreliable.7 My central
argument here is that we need to reassess the idea that Ottoman archival materials
contradict Western archival materials. They are not mutually exclusive; on the
contrary, they are in compliance with each other.
Despite attempts to separate official deportation practices from the annihilation
and purging the official records of any trace of an intention to annihilate, the
remaining documents in the BOA in Istanbul, especially the telegrams belonging to
the Cipher Office of the Interior Ministry, show two important aspects of the Armenian
deportations and killings. One is that the deportations and killings of Armenians were
a part of a larger population policy. The other is that this population policy was
implemented categorically differently toward the Armenians than toward other ethno-
religious groups within the empire, a difference that can be characterized as genocidal
intent.
Talaˆt Pasha and His Telegrams
Talaˆt Pasha’s telegrams on the smooth operation of the deportation of the Armenians
are used by Turkish sources as proof that state policy never envisioned the complete
annihilation of the Armenians. First, the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP)
made sure to maintain an appearance of a lawful framework during the execution of
the policy, so as to create the image of legally justified action. Ottoman leaders felt
compelled to disguise their actions from their own allies. However, as reports of
slaughter from Anatolia started to multiply, the German and Austrian ambassadors
began to make pointed demands in the very presence of the Ottoman state
administration. The German state, for example, made very firm demands that at
least the Protestant and Catholic Armenians be spared from the deportation. When
their demands were not heeded, and the reports of killings continued unabated, they
issued several diplomatic memos protesting the treatment of Armenians and
requesting an improvement of their situation.8
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This and other similar outside interference forced Talaˆt Pasha to provide evidence
of smooth operation in the region. He issued many telegrams, one after the other and
presented them to foreign governments as evidence of the correctness of his policy.
Despite all Talaˆt’s promises, the German consular offices continued to send out news of
the massacres occurring in their regions. For example, German Ambassador Ernst
Langenburg Hohenlohe, writing to Berlin on 25 September 1915, stated that ‘‘the news
from the consulates . . . [is that] the orders which were supposedly sent by the Sublime
Porte, aimed at amending the losses being suffered by the deported Armenians . . . are
proven to have not reached their destinations.’’9 Such incidents would be repeated, and
Talaˆt Pasha would continue to claim that the massacres were not happening and that
he was doing everything he possibly could.
In the German ambassador’s reports, Talaˆt would be referred to as a liar,
‘‘heartless,’’ and a ‘‘hypocrite.’’10 For the Austrian ambassador, Count Johann
Pallavicini, Talaˆt was ‘‘playing both sides.’’11 It is possible to gain an understanding
of how these duplicitous games were played by reading the documents connected with
German requests to spare Protestant and Catholic Armenians. The first document is a
telegram sent by Talaˆt to various regions on 4 August 1915. In this telegram he orders
a stop to the deportation of any remaining Catholic Armenians.12 A similar telegram
was sent on 15 August 1915 concerning the remaining Protestant Armenians.13 (It is
worth highlighting the fact that, until these dates, Catholic and Protestant Armenians
were deported without any consideration of their confessional ties.) In each case, Talaˆt
then immediately sent a second telegram to the regions, ordering that the first
telegram be ignored and that the deportation of Catholic and Protestant Armenians
continue.14 In order to ensure the continuation of the deportations, and to avoid
confusion about his intentions, Talaˆt sent a telegram on 11 August 1915 to certain
regions.15
The German regional consuls continued to express concerns about the deportation
of Catholic and Protestant Armenians. Eventually, in response to this pressure,
on 29 August 1915, Talaˆt sent a new set of telegrams to the regions, calling for
a halt to the deportation of Catholic and Protestant Armenians.16 After sending
this order, Talaˆt took it to the German ambassador as evidence of his compliance.17
Soon thereafter, however (on 2 September 1915), Talaˆt sent a second coded
telegram ordering the deportation of any remaining Catholic and Protestant
Armenians with their families.18 Leaving no room for confusion, on 24 October
1915 Talaˆt sent a telegram confirming his earlier orders, issued on 5 August and
2 September 1915, to continue the deportation of Catholic and Protestant
Armenians.19
We can further follow this duplicity in additional German sources that show that,
unsatisfied with these telegrams, Talaˆt sent special envoys to the regions to facilitate
the continuing deportation of Catholic and Protestant Armenians. In a report sent by
the German consul in Adana, we read that
The notification dated 29 August concerning the Armenians and given to the
Imperial Embassy from the Porte is merely an audacious deception of the embassy,
because, at the instigation of Inspector Ali Mu¨nif Bey, who was sent here, the
Porte later completely revoked this order. The authorities, of course, are only
carrying out the second instruction and continuing with the deportation without
considering denomination or creed. The number of Armenians ordered to be
murdered probably already exceeds the amount of victims in the Young Turk
Massacre of 1909.20
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In his memoirs, Ali Mu¨nif confesses that he prepared the list of Armenians to be
deported himself. Some copies of those lists would end up in the hands of the British
when they searched his home during the Armistice.21
Evidence of similar tactics used by Talaˆt in other circumstances (the deportation of
the Greeks)—that is, an initial formal telegram, sent to appease foreign ambassadors
or minority members, followed by a coded telegram explicitly nullifying the previous
one—can be found among the coded telegrams from the Interior Ministry. In a
telegram sent on 16 April 1915 to the governor’s office of Tekfurdagˇi (now known as
Tekirdagˇ), Talaˆt Pasha states quite openly,
Upon the application of the town of Vize’s Bishop, a group of four to five people from the
Patriarchate are being sent; the content of the actual notice sent by open telegram and
the memo given to the group on yesterday’s date to be ignored and the refugees from
Eregˇli are to be removed by ship with haste outside of Eregˇli and all your efforts should
be to ensure that the aforementioned group is kept under observation, that their efforts
remain fruitless and that they have no hint of any of this.22
There are many other Turkish sources in which Talaˆt is described as a liar; it
seems that there is a consensus on Talaˆt’s personal character among Turkish writers.
For example, noted Turkish historian and chronicler I˙smail Hami Danismend
describes Talaˆt as a man ‘‘whose special reputation as a liar . . . kept growing
progressively (bilhassa yalanc|l|k s o¨hreti genis lemis tir).23 The editor of the Turkish
newspaper Sabah wrote that ‘‘Talaˆt lied like a machine.’’24 Su¨leyman Naz|f, a famous
writer, publicist, and governor of several provinces, after Talaˆt’s escape from Istanbul,
described him in following way: ‘‘He, Talaˆt, had no other talent than just being tricky’’
(hileden bas ka meziyeti olmayan Talaat).25
It should not be surprising, then, that Talaˆt’s close political friends did not hesitate
to refer to him as a ‘‘liar.’’ His closest friend, Hu¨seyin Cahit, remarked that Talaˆt
‘‘would lie in both state and political matters.’’26 According to Falih R|fk| Atay, who
worked in the Interior Ministry with Talaˆt Pasha in 1913–1914, Talaˆt was a person
‘‘who did not view lies or cruelty as immoral.’’ Atay relates that the issuance of a second
coded telegram nullifying whatever order Talaˆt had just sent by official telegram was
an ordinary, everyday occurrence.27 We learn from the memoirs of Henry Morgenthau
and Halil Mentes e that Talaˆt, a former telegrapher, had a special private telegraphic
line run to his house from which he directed his communications.28
The cancellation of an order sent by official telegram through the issuing of a
second telegram was a method used quite frequently by Ottoman administrators. Hans
Von Seekt, who had served as the Ottoman Army’s chief of staff, relates that it was a
general rule that secret orders and clues to indicate invalidity would follow previously
sent official orders.29 In his memoirs, Ottoman officer Selahattin explains how Enver
Pasha often canceled the official orders he had sent, by official channels, to appease the
Germans by following them up with telegrams sent from the private telegraph office
set up in his house.30
The 5–10% Regulation
The documents available in the Istanbul archive explicitly show that the government
ordered the regional authorities to ensure that any relocated group (Muslim or non-
Muslim) not exceed 5–10% of the population in their new location. This is an important
indicator that there was a calculated social policy behind the deportations. Until
recently, some scholars, myself included, knew about this policy from a document
cited in most official Turkish sources but interpreted it as a diversion tactic by the
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Ottoman authorities.31 However, newly discovered documents from the Interior
Ministry archives indicate that this was not a diversion strategy but, rather,
a calculated policy applied not only to the relocation of Armenians, but also that of
Arabs, Kurds, Albanians, Bosnians, and others. For example, a telegram sent from
the Interior Ministry to various provinces in May 1916 demands that the Kurds
be separated from their religious leaders and sheiks and that they be settled in
Anatolia in numbers not exceeding 5% of the indigenous population.32 Another
telegram, sent by Talaˆt Pasha to Ankara on 1 October 1915, indicates that the
Albanians and Bosnians should be dispersed among the Turkish population so as not
to exceed 10% of the native population.33
Other telegrams also state that in regions where the number of Armenians is not
significant, no relocation is necessary.34 In each region, the government kept continual
track of population percentages, constantly asking for the numbers both of expelled
groups and of the remaining relocated groups in a particular place. For example,
a telegram to Canik district asks how many Greeks have been moved out of the
province, where they have been sent, and how many remain.35
In regions to which Armenians were deported, this rule ensured that they would
not represent more than 10% of the population in their new location.36 In the region of
Der Zor, for example, the Armenian population exceeded 10%; the Interior Ministry
sent telegrams to the governors of Adana, Erzurum, Bitlis, and Aleppo, saying that the
percentage of Armenians in Der Zor had passed 10% and that it was not suitable to
send more Armenians there.37 German sources also confirm that the local Ottoman
authorities in these areas followed this policy closely.38
I would like to point out two important consequences that can be inferred from the
above-mentioned information. First, if the assertion is correct that Armenians should
not represent more than 10% of the indigenous population of their new location, what
was done with those Armenians in Syria and Iraq who were over the 10% limit?
According to Ottoman statistics, the number of deported Armenians was around one
million, a number that would far exceed 10% of the indigenous population of Syria and
Iraq. The population of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces in 1914 (mostly modern
Iraq and Syria) could be estimated at between 2 and 2.5 million, including the
Christian population.39 The Ottoman documents themselves speak against the
Turkish state’s thesis that there was no planned genocide, because they cannot
answer the question of how approximately one million Armenians could fail to exceed
5–10% of the local population. If one adheres to this official thesis, the only way to
explain the variation in numbers is to posit that the Armenians simply evaporated.40
The second important point that we can infer from these documents is that the loss
of Armenian life was not due to logistical and wartime complications of the deporta-
tions, as the official histories claim, but was a direct consequence of this relocation
policy. This becomes clear when we see that, according to Ottoman documents, the
resettlement of roughly one million Muslims into the evacuated Armenian and Greek
villages was largely successful and was accomplished without great loss of life.
Documents Revealing Different Treatment of Armenians
The documents from the BOA paint a very clear picture of different treatment for the
Armenians, some of which can be used as direct evidence of the genocidal intent of the
Ottoman authorities. Among these records, Talaˆt Pasha’s coded telegram dated
12 July 1915 and sent to Diyarbekir is the most notorious. In this telegram he
relates how the news has reached him that, along with the Armenians in the region,
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other Christians are also being murdered. He states that he has heard that the number
of dead has reached an estimated 2,000 and then adds,
Whereas it is categorically forbidden for other Christians to be included under the
disciplinary and political measures adopted in regard to the Armenians, an immediate
stop should be put to this sort of occurrence, which will have a bad effect on public
opinion, and will indiscriminately place the lives of Christians in extraordinary danger,
and the reality of the situation [should be] reported.41
The language could not be clearer. People, many of them employed as civil servants by
the state, were being killed at the behest of the governor’s office. This, however, was
not really the point for Talaˆt; in fact, he was complaining that a policy that was to have
been applied to Armenians alone had in fact spread to other Christians. It is for this
reason that the telegram demands that the killing of other Christians stop.42
The fate of the governor of Diyarbekir, Res it Bey, reveals to a great extent the
reality of state policy toward the Armenians. According to the BOA documents, the
killing continued anyway, and so Talaˆt sent additional requests (on 22 July and 2
August 1915) to Res it Bey to cease the indiscriminate killing of Christians, reminding
him of his personal responsibility in the matter.43 Despite these threats, there was
never any inquiry into the governor’s responsibility for the deaths. However, Res it was
eventually taken to task for expropriating the wealth of his victims, especially the
Armenians. In a telegram dated 6 October 1915, Talaˆt inquires about the jewelry and
other possessions taken from the deportees, demanding that the wealth be sent to
Istanbul.44 Later Res it was promoted to Ankara. When he subsequently tried to buy
a villa beyond his obvious means, he was immediately removed from his position.
After the war, when Res it Bey committed suicide, wartime governor and newspaper
editor Su¨leyman Nafiz exposed this story in the former governor’s obituary,
commenting that Talaˆt Pasha had no qualms about his capacity for killing but could
not abide his theft.45
Other documents in the BOA can also be seen to show the genocidal intent of the
Ottoman authorities. A telegram was sent from Istanbul by the Directorate of General
Security (EUM) on 12 January 1916 to the regional office in Ankara, demanding
‘‘information as to whether the Armenians, whose names are known, are alive, and if
so, their whereabouts following the deportation operation.’’46 It reveals the kind of
anxiety the administrators in Istanbul were experiencing. What they wanted to learn
was whether those Armenians they had identified were alive, and, if so, where they
were. Similarly, anxiety in the regions of Erzurum, Mamuretu¨laziz, Diyarbekir, and
Bitlis is shown in a telegram stating that
there’s word spreading that after the Armenians are annihilated in Dersim and the
surrounding areas, the Kurds are going to be next. All precautions necessary must be
taken to prevent the spread of these kinds of rumors.47
Besides the obvious anxieties shown above, the documents of the Cipher Office of
the Interior Ministry also provide important circumstantial evidence of the genocidal
intent of the Ottoman authorities. As we know, the 1948 UN Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide counts among the elements of
genocide the forcible transfer of children of one group to another.48 Among the
documents in the BOA are many that show such intentional acts. We learn from these
documents that Armenian children were taken from their families, sent to Muslim
villages where there were no Armenians, married off to Muslims, or settled in
orphanages with explicit instructions that they were to be raised in a manner
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consistent with Muslim norms and customs. For example, a telegram sent by the
Interior Ministry’s Directorate of Tribes and Immigrants (AMMU)49 to various
provincial offices on 30 April 1916, after stating that ‘‘those families who have no one
and are unprotected should be sent to villages and towns where there are no foreigners
or Armenians,’’ goes on to urge that
young and widowed women should be married off, children up to the age of twelve
should be settled into orphanages, and if an adequate space in the orphanage is not
available, then they should be settled with Muslim families and raised with that
community’s values and customs.50
A telegram sent by Talaˆt Pasha himself, on 30 December 1915, to the governor’s
office in Nigˇde makes his demands quite explicit:
on the condition that they be raised as Muslims, the children should be settled in
Muslim villages where there are no Armenians or foreigners, or settled into
orphanages. The young women and girls must be married off to Muslims.51
The document shows that it was considered a necessity that the Armenians as a group
be prevented from maintaining their identity. In yet another telegram, we see that the
aim is to tear families apart by taking the men away. This telegram asks that those
families who have had their males taken away be ‘‘moved to villages and towns where
there are no Armenians or foreigners so that they can be settled away from each
other.’’52 These records show that the CUP leaders intended to destroy the conditions
under which the Armenians had maintained their lives.
The Seizure of Armenian Property
In addition to the issue of the deportation of Armenians themselves, it is important to
understand what happened to their personal and real property. The treatment of
Armenians’ material goods shows the two-track organization of the deportations. On
the one hand there are obvious and explicit legal and financial rules for the treatment
of such property; on the other, we can see from the BOA documents that these goods
were in fact controlled in other ways that contradict the legal framework. My
argument here is essentially that the seizure of Armenian property, and the manner in
which it was utilized, proves incontrovertibly that the CUP agenda was to rid Anatolia
of Armenian life and culture by pulling them out by the roots.
The fact that many laws and regulations were promulgated for the purpose of
managing the use of, sale of, and later compensation for the property the Armenians
left behind is commonly used by Turkish authorities to argue that deportation was
never meant to lead to annihilation. It is claimed that instances of abuse and unlawful
seizure of goods were isolated incidents, and that the state took Armenian property
and goods under its protection and later compensated the owners when they were
settled at their ultimate destinations. It is true that, on the subject of protection and
compensation, many temporary laws and regulations were issued.53
The first attempt at regulatory organization occurred on 30 May 1915, with a
decision issued by the cabinet ministers. According to this decision, the Armenians
would be ‘‘distributed property and land’’ in the places where they were resettled, and
the ‘‘property and furnishings or valuables’’ they had left behind ‘‘would be returned to
them in some shape or manner.’’ In furtherance of this goal, in order to set out
‘‘the acquisition, protection and management of abandoned property and the treatment
of, the settlement of, and effects to and organization, examination, and inspection of
peoples,’’ various commissions in the regions were to be established by the Ministries
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of the Interior and of Finance. This instructional notice, issued by the Office of Tribal
and Refugee Settlement (IAMM) of the Interior Ministry, contained fifteen separate
clauses outlining how the settlement and maintenance of all these people was to take
place.54 On 31 May 1915 this instructional notice was sent, along with a letter, to the
Ministries of the Interior, War, and Finance for the purpose of implementation of the
regulations.55
The second organizational attempt took place on 10 June 1915.56 The very long
instructional manual was made up of thirty-four separate clauses. Because of the
disorganization and confusion of the operational stage, and the frequent need for
answers to questions from the local administrators, telegram after telegram was
issued, and new instructions had to be sent out.57 Besides the looting and
embezzlement that occurred at the local level, there was a bigger problem that had
not been addressed by the instructional manual. How were the many foreign
companies—German ones being at the top of the list—to be compensated for their
accounts receivable from the Armenians who had been deported? Germany, which had
been making attempts to address the problem from the beginning and later issued an
ultimatum on 8 August 1915 stating that it would ‘‘hold the Ottomans liable for the
losses being suffered,’’ finally issued an official memo in protest on 16 September 1915,
when it became obvious that previous attempts to be heard were futile.58 Finally, on
26 September 1915, two days before the opening of the next Assembly session, the
cabinet ministers issued a temporary law to organize the use of Armenian property.
Later this law, which changed the decree of 30 May with the aim of ‘‘liquidating
all Armenian goods and property,’’ would be harshly criticized in the Senate by Ahmet
R|za.59 In order to execute the law, a new proposal would be put forth on 8 November
1915 and an official decree on the subject would be published.60 The salience of
these organizational efforts is that official status was accorded to the newly established
regional commissions to manage the abandoned properties.
Those who argue that there was no intent on the part of the Ottoman rulers to
annihilate the Armenians attribute great importance to these detailed and extensive
regulations. This evidence is problematic, however, because there is not one document
to verify that the policy was ever actually realized. Until now not a single record has
been found in the Ottoman Archives to show that any Armenian who was forcibly
moved ever received compensation from the sale of his property.61
There is no evidence to show that the land, houses, seeds, and tools that the laws
and regulations promised to the Armenians once they were resettled were ever
actually granted. One would expect thousands of records in the archives to document
how many Armenians were resettled, and in what areas, and the kinds of difficulties
they encountered. One would also expect thousands of documents on the amount of
income realized, how that income was returned, the resources distributed to the
Armenians in the places where they were resettled, and so on. But there is not one
piece of paper to document any of this. While the telegrams sent by the Interior
Ministry to the regions where Armenians were deported, asking ‘‘How many people
have been sent away, how many Armenians remain?’’ number in the hundreds, it
cannot be a coincidence that there is not a single telegram asking about their condition
in the places where they were moved.
It is not a coincidence, then, that there are hundreds of records showing who
received the Armenian properties that were left behind, how they were sold, what
income was realized from their sale, and what was done with that income. The reality
reflected in these records is that the Ottoman administrators pursued a very
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systematic and orderly policy on how to manage the property and possessions left
behind by deported Armenians. The only principle that cannot be found in this
systematic and orderly policy is any intention to return just compensation of these
properties to their rightful owners, or to make an effort to deal with their problems of
settlement once they were deported.
What the records show is that the Ottoman administrators used Armenian
property in five principal ways.
1. To Meet the Needs of Newly Arrived Muslim Immigrants
Property left behind by the Armenians was distributed among the Muslims resettled in
the areas formerly occupied by Armenians. This intention was openly declared in both
the 30 May and the 15 June organizational proposals. To illustrate this, here are
several communications sent to various regional offices at the time:
 A telegram sent by the Office of Tribal and Refugee Settlement (IAMM) of
the Ministry of the Interior to the regional offices of Ankara, Adana, Aleppo,
Hu¨davendigar, and others, along with the governor’s offices of Izmit, Urfa,
Canik, and others, about assigning Armenians’ empty houses to the coming
immigrants.62
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the Presidency of the Trabzon Commission for
Liquidation, directing that the refugees in the region be clothed with the goods
left behind in the warehouses and stores of the region.63
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the regional offices of Ankara, Adana, Aleppo,
and others, along with the governors’ offices of Izmit, Eskis ehir, Urfa, and
others, directing that refugees from the war zone, who were in need and
without support, be settled into abandoned properties and that they be provided
with property and provisions and placed in a variety of jobs.64
2. To Support the Growth of a Muslim Bourgeoisie
Much of the property left behind by the Armenians was distributed among Muslim
individuals or companies in the region for the purpose of creating a Muslim bourgeois
class, often without demand for payment in kind or on terms of very low payment or
payment in installments. Here are some examples of such activities from the Cipher
Office of the Interior Ministry:
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to Adana (Do¨rtyol) and from the Directorate of
General Security (EUM) to Diyarbekir regional offices states that ‘‘it may be
suitable that the properties of Armenians owned prior to the deportation be sold
and transferred at a reasonable exchange to the Muslim population.’’65
 Telegrams sent by the IAMM to the regional offices of Erzurum, Adana, Edirne,
and others; to the governors’ offices of Urfa, Izmit, Kayseri, Maras , and others;
and the Presidencies of the Commissions for Liquidation in Tekfurdagˇ, Adana,
Aleppo, Gemlik, and others, states that, for the purpose of increasing the
number of Muslim businesses, the properties left by Armenians should be
transferred by way of issuance of shares that may be acquired by business
owners and farmers and that, in furtherance of this aim, whatever needs to be
done should be done so that intra-Muslim trade is thereby developed.66
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the Presidency of the Commission for
Liquidation in Trabzon states that ‘‘in order to transfer the business of artisans
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and trade to Muslims, abandoned contents of stores should be sold to honorable
young people by installment.’’67
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the Presidency of the Commission for
Liquidation in the district of Ordu outlines how the businesses of Armenian
artisans and tradesmen should be transferred to Muslims, and to whom they
should be transferred.68
 A supplemental telegram sent to the regional offices of Edirne, Adana, Ankara,
and others, along with the governors’ offices of Kayseri, Canik, and others and
the Presidencies of the Commissions for Liquidation of Adana, Aleppo, Izmit,
and others, contains instructions for the low-cost rental of factories, stores, and
manufacturing facilities left by the Armenians to Muslim companies, so that
they do not lie vacant and unused.69
3. To Meet Military Needs
One of the most important needs met by Armenian properties was that of the armed
forces. Military needs were met either by commandeering of buildings, which were
used by the military during their operations, or by selling commodities produced by
the fields and lands abandoned by Armenians. It must be added that the policy of
using abandoned property for military purposes was not confined to Armenians; the
abandoned property of Greeks met the same fate. Here are a few examples of the
communications sent in connection with military use of abandoned property:
 A telegram from the IAMM to the governor’s office of Urfa discusses the milling
and processing of abandoned crops transferred from the Armenians and the
consignment of the resulting commodities to the military.70
 A telegram sent by the Office of Communications, Ministry of War, to the
governor’s office of Ku¨tahya asking, for the purpose of being used by the
military, for the price, type, and amount of property and goods.71
 A telegram sent by the AMMU to the governor’s office of Kala-| Sultaniyeye
(modern C¸anakkale), in furtherance of an official report, discusses the delivery
to the military, after appraisal, of the value of grapes from abandoned
vineyards.72
 A telegram sent by the AMMU to the regional offices of Aydin and
Hu¨davendigar, along with the governor’s office of Karasi and the Presidency
of the Commissions for Liquidation at Bursa and Karasi, pertains to the
delivery of the harvest of grapes and figs from abandoned Greek properties
to the military.73
 A telegram sent by the AMMU to the governor’s office of Mentes e directs that
the abandoned properties of Greeks, in accordance with the proposal, be
consigned to the Muslim refugees (muhacir) and the army, with the exception of
live animals, which should be distributed to the local population.74
4. To Cover the Expense of Deporting the Armenians
The records in my possession show that income received from the sale of property left
behind by the Armenians was used to compensate the state for the expenses associated
with deporting them.75
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the Presidency of the Commission for the
Administration of Abandoned Property in Aleppo concerns the use of part of the
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income received from the sale of abandoned livestock for the deportation and
maintenance of Armenians.76
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the Director of Immigrants, S u¨kru¨ Bey, in
Aleppo orders the use of the income derived from the profits of abandoned
property left in Aleppo, along with the monies to be sent from Eskis ehir,
for the purposes of meeting the expenses of deporting and maintaining
Armenians.77
 A telegram sent by the IAMM to the office of the deputy governor of Aleppo
directs that the income from the profits of abandoned property be consigned to
the finance treasury for the purpose of meeting the expenses of maintaining and
deporting Armenians.78
Some of these documents discuss the fact that some of the state’s expenses in
connection with deporting Armenians could not be met and explicitly indicate that
Armenian properties would have to be used for this purpose and that state expenses
would therefore be compensated:
Since the maintenance of the Armenians deported from Zeytunlu cannot be
appropriately met by the state alone, they must provide their own sustenance. Please
specify the amount spent for their maintenance thus far and how many kurus [units of
Ottoman currency] are needed to continue the resettlement.79
5. For Various Other State Needs
In some circumstances, Armenian-owned buildings were used either as prisons or for
various other state needs. Examples of communications regarding the need for prison
facilities are the following:
 A telegram sent by the Directorate of State Real Estate and the Office of Prisons
to the regional and governors’ offices of Edirne, Adana, Ankara, Ic¸el, Nigˇde, and
others inquires about the presence of abandoned buildings large enough to be
converted to prisons and their state of repair.80
 A telegram from the General Health Office (S|hh|ye Mu¨diriyeti Umumiyesi) to
local offices in Erzurum, Bitlis, and Sivas provinces, among others, reserves
buildings and health equipment left behind after the deportation of non-
Muslims for the use of health offices in these regions.81
What all these documents tell us is that the Ottoman government had a systematic
policy toward the properties left behind—those that could be saved from looting—
which was in furtherance of specific purposes. After the property, and the income that
could be derived from it, had been used for the state’s various needs, there was nothing
left to be returned to its lawful owners, the Armenians.
Investigating the Deportation
One of the primary pieces of evidence used to support the notion that the deportation
was not a means to annihilate the Armenians of Anatolia are the investigations
initiated during World War I. According to this argument, there were isolated
incidents of abuse by local officials and administrators, but ‘‘by forming special
investigative commissions . . . the guilty were prosecuted by administrative courts.’’82
Similarly, a large proportion of the 1,397 people who were investigated are supposed
eventually to have been prosecuted and sentenced to various punishments, including
execution.83 The figure of 1,397, originally given by Kamuraˆn Gu¨ru¨n, has been
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repeated in every source. This repetition of unsubstantiated points has become one of
the main arguments of official Turkish state policy. But Gu¨ru¨n has neither published
any single document in support of this figure nor even quoted from any document.
Repeating Gu¨ru¨n’s number, Halac¸ogˇlu asserts that the state officials found guilty for
their crimes ‘‘were tried in Military Tribunals and were punished by hard sentences,’’
including the death penalty.84 Halac¸ogˇlu cites twelve different documents in support of
his thesis, but only their catalogue numbers; he neither reproduces nor quotes any part
of any of these telegrams. Presumably this is because none of the documents that he
cites supports his claim. In fact, none of these documents contains the information that
any officer was either tried or sentenced for any crime against Armenian life.
The same documents, however, do make it clear that the sensitivity not shown
toward Armenians as human beings was nevertheless exhibited by the Ottoman
government toward their property. The state, which intended to make systematic use
of the abandoned property, made every effort to prevent it from falling into the hands
of individual looters. Prosecutions were, in fact, initiated against those accused of
looting or abusing authority over property. The above-mentioned telegrams cited by
Halac¸ogˇlu all deal with embezzlement and malfeasance related to how to handle the
remaining property. A telegram sent to Mamuretu¨laziz province, granting permission
for the interrogation of the Kaymakam Besni Edhem Kadri Bey, can be given as an
example.85 The great expenditure of effort to prevent individuals from laying claim to
Armenian property points to the state’s intention to keep all of that property as booty.
It was, in fact, because state officials saw abuse of abandoned property, and
recognized that they were losing control of the looting, that a spate of telegrams was
sent from the central office to the regional offices with orders to form investigative
commissions. The fact that these commissions were formed is used as evidence to prove
that the government did not promote a policy of murder and annihilation of
Armenians, asserting that the state did what it could to take control of the abuses.
On the contrary, however, a statement made in December 1918, after the Armistice, by
an official who worked in one of the commissions reveals that the earlier commissions
were formed as a result of pressure by foreign governments and that their authority
was limited to investigating the looting and abuses associated with abandoned
property. Additionally, the commissions were not granted the authority to investigate
high-ranking officials, nor to consign them to the investigating authority of the
military tribunals. In fact, the commissions often did not even bother to investigate the
regions for which they were supposedly responsible. The same official noted that
unfortunately the reports were not taken seriously at the time. Since the commissions
were formed with officials appropriate for basic investigations only, with limited
authority, only low-ranking civil servants, middle-level suspects, were sent to the
military tribunals for prosecution. As for the others, one could say, the reports which
were submitted had absolutely no effect.86
The ineffectiveness of these commissions was confirmed by testimony from the
wartime Grand Vizier, Said Halim Pasha. In his testimony before the Parliamentary
Investigative Commission, known as the ‘‘Fifth Branch,’’ which had been formed in
November 1918, Halim Pasha stated that,
following the massacres of the Armenians, investigative commissions were formed.
Pursuant to their duties, these commissions turned in their findings. Nevertheless, the
Interior Ministry did not want to reveal the results of the investigation. Despite all my
urgings and persistence, they obstinately dragged their feet concealing the real facts.
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So long as Talaˆt Pasha was part of the Interior Ministry, it was obvious that there
would be nothing coming from the investigations.87
As a result, these commissions, formed solely for the purpose of lessening pressure by
foreign states, were not even successful in fulfilling their limited authority to
investigate abuses and irregularities.
Another reality revealed by an examination of the records of the Interior Ministry’s
Cipher Office is that there were investigations brought against state agents who saved
Armenians, albeit through bribery, from the deportations. The following records show
the extent to which the Ottoman government acted with fastidiousness on the subject
of Armenian property, a quality lacking in its actions toward the Armenians
themselves. The last two examples are of investigations of civil servants accused of
helping Armenians to escape.
(1) A telegram was sent from the IAMM to the Mamuretu¨laziz regional offices and
office of the Presidency for the Commission for Abandoned Property about the
investigation of the news that officials and gendarmerie in Malatya and
Akc¸adagˇ had looted abandoned property worth about five million lira.88
(2) A telegram was sent by the EUM to Muhtar (Elder) Bey, Inspector of Civil
Servants for Ankara, regarding the need to travel to Izmit for the
investigation of irregularities and abuses arising in connection with the sale of
property belonging to Armenians who had been expelled from Izmit,
Adapazar|, and Bahc¸ecik.89
(3) A telegram sent from the EUM to the governor’s office of Diyarbekir relates to
the establishment of a commission to investigate abuse and neglect by civil
servants during the expulsion of the Armenians and to submit these to the
Military Tribunal for prosecution.90
(4) A telegram sent from the EUM to the Konya regional offices concerns the
investigation and prosecution of the deportation official of Konya station,
Mu¨laz|m Tahsin Efendi, who was accused of smuggling Armenians to Istanbul
using fake identification.91
(5) A telegram was sent from the EUM to the Aleppo regional office in connection
with transferring files to the military tribunal of gendarmerie guards who, in
exchange for money, had released some Armenians on the road to Der Zor
from Istanbul and Aleppo.92
The Matter of Deportees from Istanbul and Izmir
One of the other main arguments used to refute the idea that the deportation of
Armenians in 1915 was carried out with the purpose of ultimately annihilating them
that there were no deportations out of Istanbul or Izmir.93 However, the records of the
Cipher Office in the Interior Ministry give ample evidence that, in fact, there were
deportations from both these cities. (It is important to clarify that when we speak of
deportations from Istanbul in particular, in this instance, we are not referring to the
intellectuals arrested on 24 April 1915; that first group had been expelled to Ayagˇ and
C¸ank|r|.)94
There are extensive reports of a large deportation, apart from the initial arrests of
intellectuals, in British, American, and German sources that can be confirmed by
similar reports in the Cipher Office of the Interior Ministry. Below are some
summarized accounts of various archival sources that confirm deportations from
Istanbul and Izmir.
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The first record is presented in the ‘‘Blue Book’’ published in 1916 by Arnold
Toynbee. It is a letter written by the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul, dated 15 August
1915. Speaking about the deportees from Istanbul, he states that
now it’s Constantinople’s turn. People are in a panic waiting for their bad luck to
descend upon them. Innumerable people have been arrested and sent outside of
Istanbul. Most will certainly die. Up until now those who had been deported were born
in the provinces but now it is the shop owners of Istanbul . . . no matter what it takes, we
are going to fight to save the Armenians of Istanbul from this horrible destruction . . .95
In another letter from the Balkan division of the Dashnak organization, dated
18 October 1915, information is given that
after giving everything they had, including their shoes to the gendarmerie, thousands
of poor Armenians who had been deported from Istanbul were sent walking from Izmit
towards Konya. Anyone who was rich enough to have money for the train was cheated
out of it by the gendarmerie, who took everything they had.96
The American missionary William S. Dodd, who was in Konya at the time,
repeated similar information:
another method of deportation was in making people walk and it was applied to a great
extent to the males who were deported from Istanbul. Their families were living in the
[Anatolian] villages and towns and they had been working in Istanbul, living without
their families. While the Turkish government engages in continuous propaganda over
how they haven’t deported anyone from Istanbul, they arrest thousands [in Istanbul]
who are working to support their families and deport them.97
German records from the same period document extensive deportations from
Istanbul. On 5 December 1915, the German foreign affairs secretary, Gottlieb von
Jagow, relayed news he had received from the Armenian Sofia Dashnak Committee to
Ambassador Metternich. According to Jagow,
contrary to their earlier promises, the Turkish government has started deporting the
Armenians from Constantinople. Supposedly 10,000 have been deported thus far, and
most of them have been killed in the hills of Izmit. There’s a list of 70,000 that’s been
drawn up.
Jagow sent Metternich the directive that ‘‘if this information is correct, please engage
in a forceful protest.’’98
Metternich, who responded to this telegram on 7 December 1915, reported that,
according to the Directorate of Security (EUM) in Istanbul, the number of Armenians
deported was around 30,000:
Based upon reliable information which I urge you to keep secret, after the 30,000 who
have been deported and 30,000 who have escaped during the past summer months,
there have been 4,000 Armenians deported from Constantinople to Anatolia and of the
80,000 who continue to live in Constantinople, it is planned that they be dispatched
piecemeal.99
What can be understood from these documents is that the deportations from
Istanbul occurred episodically. The newly available documents in the BOA support the
claim that there were, in fact, deportations from Istanbul and that they were carried
out according to specific criteria. We can infer from these documents that there were
four categories of deportees: unmarried males, the unemployed, those born outside of
Istanbul,100 and those accused of having been associated with Armenian organizations
such as the Dashnaks.101
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We can also confirm the Istanbul deportations based on data from the various
Istanbul military tribunals held between 1918 and 1922. For example, in the seventh
hearing of the trial known as the Nahiye Directors Case, an Armenian gave testimony
as to his experience of being deported, along with 200 others, in a convoy in July and
August 1915. Similar statements were made in another trial, against a police officer
named Hidayet Efendi. In this case the prosecution was brought for the crime of
‘‘causing the deportation of unmarried Armenians in the neighborhood of U¨sku¨dar and
seizing the property of some by entering the homes.’’ The accused was charged with the
deportation of close to 350 unmarried Armenian males from U¨sku¨dar.102
Other telegrams reveal that the deportations from Istanbul went through Konya to
Der Zor. In an EUM telegram to the Aleppo regional office appears the report that ‘‘the
gendarmerie guards are being prosecuted by the Military Tribunals for releasing
Armenians on the way to Der Zor from Istanbul and Aleppo in exchange for money.’’103
Other examples include the following:
(1) A telegram from the EUM to Edirne, Adana, Aydin, Ankara, Konya, and other
regional offices and the governors’ offices of Bolu, Kayseri, and others concerns
the dispatch of Armenians deported from Istanbul and other areas through
Konya, Karaman, Tarsus, Kars, Maras , and Pazarcik to Der Zor.104
(2) A telegram sent from EUM to the governor’s office of Izmit grants permission
from Dersaadet (Istanbul) for the expulsion of Armenians in Istanbul who
originate from Izmit and the surrounding areas.105
There are similar accounts of deportations from Izmir in both Ottoman and
German archival sources. A telegram from the EUM to the governor’s office of
Karahisar-i Sahip relates to the deportation of Armenians from Izmir by way of
Diyarbekir en route to Mosul.106 A German report from Izmir dated 10 November 1916
confirms that the deportation continued.107 It is well known that the deportation of the
Armenians from Izmir was stopped by the intervention of German General Liman von
Sanders.108 Significantly, there is further evidence of his intervention because it was
backed fully by the German Foreign Office.109
Some Concluding Remarks
The documents available in the BOA confirm the impression given by British, German,
Austrian, and American sources that the intention of the CUP’s policy toward
Armenians was clearly not to relocate and reestablish the Armenian communities of
Anatolia. What was intended was, in the CUP’s own words, ‘‘[e]saˆsl| bir suretde hal ve
fasl| ile ku¨lliyen izaˆlesi’’: ‘‘the total liquidation [of the Armenian question] in a manner
that is comprehensive and absolute.’’110 For this reason, a reassessment of the BOA
documents is necessary and timely.
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